1 Introduction

1. Making decisions – whatever the beliefs, motives or reasons that support them – is an inherent necessity in any process that requires the intervention of a third party to solve conflicts. When one faces this contingency, different ways of solving it arise: magical thinking, personal judgment or rational judgment are institutional bets that, within a given social arrangement, can make sense and satisfy their respective cultural standards of normative control.
2. Comparing the different answers provided by Law to this problem, aiming at finding the ‘right mixture of differences and similarities’^[3] in their respective cultural contexts^[4], critically evaluating them^[5] – even though one is aware of the need for equal respect and consideration for all^[6] – and recording any tendencies regarding this matter is my objective in this work.^[7] To do so, I begin by distinguishing decision, control and justification and then I analyse some data that emerge from the comparison between different legal systems regarding the duty to provide reasoned decisions.

2 Decision, Control and Justification

3. In order to sentence, judges must first make a decision.^[8] The decision as a whole is made up of several micro decisions about the meaning of facts, evidence and law. It is clear, however, that little does it matter how the judge actually arrived at these decisions. It does not matter what your beliefs or your inner motives are. The heart has its reasons which reason knows not. Attempting to trace the different lines of thought of the judge does not make much sense within the legal world, given that the purpose of reasoning is to demonstrate the connection of his decision to law. That is to say: controlling the reasons for the judicial decision from the perspective of law.
4. From this perspective, what matters are the judicial reasons – the way in which reasons are justified. On the great game board of ideas, one can see the passage from decision to the reasons moving three squares forward. In 1961, Richard Wasserstrom proposed the application of the distinction between context of discovery and context of justification – which originated from epistemology^[9] – to judicial decisions.^[10] This is how our story begins. In 1971, Jerzy Wróblewski, influenced by these ideas, proposes another distinction, between internal and external justification, demonstrating that the factual and legal statements formulated by the judge must be justified from the logical point of view (internal justification) and the argumentative point of view (external justification).^[11] In 1975, Michele Taruffo makes the final move by proposing the adoption of these concepts so as to draw the profile of the reasoning of decisions, detailing its minimum content.^[12] This leads to a foundation framework capable of accounting for the interpretation and application of law in judicial decisions – its characteristic field ^[13] – based on logical-argumentative theories of Law^[14].
5. Once this scheme was established, the assessment of the fidelity of the decision and its rationality ended up being predominantly linked to the method by which one deals with the legal reasons used to justify the different interpretive decisions that the judge must take in order to solve a case – that is, they end up dependent on the reasoning. One must start from the reasons that justify the decision to intersubjectively control the decision.^[15] It is no coincidence that, in 2007, Pierluigi Chiassoni started the Tecnica dell’Interpretazione Giuridica (technique of legal interpretation), paying special attention to the statement of reasons: interpreting and applying the law live in the same skin.^[16] Something a bit Almodovarish. This is why, far from being a sectoral problem, the issue of reasoning permeates the entire legal experience.
6. This fact is attested, moreover, by a well-known Comparative Law enterprise. Interpreting Statutes, from 1991, and Interpreting Precedents, from 1997, are two works edited by Neil MacCormick and Robert Summers that highlight the importance of ‘operative interpretation’ – that is, the interpretation that aims to solve problems in everyday life – whether using ‘statutes’ or ‘precedents’ (which obviously presupposes certain models of justification for judicial decisions).^[17] If it is possible to align, based on comparative experience, a ‘common core of good reasons’ to the interpretation of ‘statutes’^[18], would not it be equally possible to reach a ‘common core’^[19] of the duty to justify judicial decisions?  
7. Judicial decisions have to be justified in terms of several requirements attached to the Rule of Law. There is an internal concern, which responds to the need to enable process participants to understand, criticize and control decisions (‘funzione endoprocessuale’ (intra-procedural function)).^[20] There is an external one, which consults the public interest to know the reasons why cases are decided in this or that way (‘funzione extraprocessuale’ (extra-procedural function))^[21], reinforcing the accountability and the transparency of Civil Justice.^[22] This, however, has not always been so: in an enchanted world, judicial decisions would be based on magical thinking – on widespread beliefs in the community.^[23] Reasoning based on the law is the antithesis of this way of looking at things, being – not by chance – one of the signs of the rationalization of Law. This is why, from a comparative perspective, in some of the main countries of the world, the duty to provide reasoned decisions is a constant, despite its different objects and levels of legislative and jurisprudential detail. All this is important in order to have a proper dimension of the meaning and the extent of the duty to provide reasoned decisions.

3 Comparative Law and the Requirements Related to Justification and its Style

8. If Law works with – at least – four variables of indeterminacy (the existence, the non-existence and the meaning of facts; the existence, the non-existence, and the meaning and weight of proof; the meaning of texts; and the scope of norms)^[24], the act of interpreting and applying laws must account for these different dimensions in the most objective way, that is, enabling an intersubjective control of reasons based on the judicial decision. It is no coincidence that the existence of ‘reasoned explanation’ about its ‘essential factual, legal, and evidentiary basis’ is one of the basic principles of transnational civil proceeding listed by the American Law Institute and UNIDROIT^[25]. In a similar vein, the Model European Rules of Civil Procedure of the European Law Institute and UNIDROIT require judgments to contain their ‘legal and factual grounds’.^[26]
9. The procedural systems converge to the need for a decision that faces factual, legal and evidential issues.^[27] The duty to provide reasoned decisions usually has a constitutional provision and is expressly accepted in the legislation.^[28] What varies is the degree of detail of this requirement. I must say right away, however, that my objective here is not to promote a show in which different systems step onto the catwalk, one after the other, showing, in most cases, small variations among them. While useful, it can end up being a bit tedious. The idea here is to make it possible to assemble a puzzle capable of representing the duty to provide reasoned decisions from a comparative perspective.
10. Some legal systems make more detailed requirements regarding facts and evidence. In Spain, for example, the decision is required to consider not only facts, evidence and the law, as is generally required, but it also points to the need to consider the different factual and legal elements, appreciating them individually and jointly in the light of the rules of logic and reason.^[29] In Portugal, the judge is required to specifically point out the facts they considered proven and unproven and the respective pertinent reasons, in addition to indicating the inferences drawn from the evidence.^[30]
11. Others take a lighter approach towards reasoned decisions, particularizing certain issues. In Argentina, for instance, the judge is required to provide a decision that is ‘razonablemente fundada’ (reasonably justified) ^[31] – jurists mention, moreover, that the Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación (Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation) considers that a decision that does not follow its precedent cannot be considered razonablemente fundada, having thus to be qualified as arbitrary.^[32] In Germany, although the established legal doctrine is not legally binding, its persuasive value imposes on the judge, in the event of non-compliance, the duty to explain in detail the reasons for not following it.^[33] In Italy, the legislator even allows legal reasoning to be exclusively based on precedents.^[34] Indeed, these are rules that mirror the broader trend of using precedents for the solution of cases, even in countries with a Roman-canonical tradition.^[35] 
12. Some systems go even deeper in detail. Brazilian law is a good example.^[36] It requires reasoning to be presented in a concrete, structured and complete manner. What does it mean? Concrete: the case must be judged.^[37] It is not enough to: i) indicate, reproduce or paraphrase provisions without explaining their relationship with the case, ii) invoke vague terms, without explaining the concrete reason for their incidence, iii) use of grounds that could justify any other decision, and iv) application or not of precedents without demonstrating the ratio, the subsumption, the distinguishing or the overruling. Structured: the interpretation and the application must be based on clearly identified facts, evidence and norms.^[38] Complete: there must be an effective dialogue between the grounds alleged by the parties and those used in the decision.^[39] This dialogue, obviously, does not need to encompass all the allegations of the parties, but it must necessarily contemplate all those that are capable of, by themselves, invalidating the conclusion adopted. The reasoning is no longer measured only by the very reasoning of the judge but becomes also an activity of the parties. In other words, there is a passage from the criterion of sufficient decision - anchored, deep down, on the well-known thesis of the intimate motives – to the criterion of complete justification – which is grounded on the need for intersubjective control – and, therefore objective – of the exercise of power.^[40] 
13. Some countries still show certain flexibility regarding the content of the reasoning. This is the case, for instance, in Canada and Italy. Canadian law is distinguished by the fact that it expressly emphasizes the flexibility of the reasoning requirement: a decision on a less complex case is expected to have a less in-depth reasoning than one that deals with a relevant constitutional issue.^[41] Italian law also stands out for the same reason since it allows for a more concise reasoning for the solution of simpler cases.^[42] This is a reflection of a guideline – which took shape within the civil procedure from the reforms promoted by Lord Woolf in England at the end of the last century and even reached the Model European Rules of Civil Procedure^[43] – which seeks to balance the judicial effort with the importance that must be conferred on each type of dispute (the ‘theory of proportionate justice’^[44]).
14. Some countries, moreover, expressly waive the provision of reasoned decisions. This is the notorious case of US law when there is a provision for a jury trial.^[45] In cases like this, the formation of the de facto judgment obeys the intimate motives of the jurors, which usually bloom inside a true black box^[46], without it being possible to know the evidence that led to the judicial result.
15. Seen from the perspective of the right to an adversarial proceeding, the duty to provide reasoned decisions also presents two possible solutions. On the one hand, in England, for instance, following the Common Law principle concerning open justice and in following the Art 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the judge is required to point out the way in which he reached his conclusions,^[47] but not to address every argument presented by the parties: it is enough to demonstrate that the decision is not arbitrary.^[48] On the other hand, in Brazil, for instance, the judge is required to dialogue with the parties regarding all the relevant grounds raised by them, and this requirement is seen as a basic consequence of the right to an adversarial proceeding^[49] – which in turn stems from the need to ensure the effective participation of the parties in the construction of the judicial decision.
16. In relation to the function that reasoning plays, it is usually attached to the need for accountability of Civil Justice and for control by the parties and the public opinion of the reasons that support judicial decisions, which can be well demonstrated in English law.^[50] 
17. Connected with this requirement is the growing concern to make decisions, especially those of the Supreme Courts, accessible to the public. For this reason, in France, jurists point to the need to promote the use of clearer language in decisions (without prejudice to the inevitable use of technical-legal terms), noting that the brief, antiquated style of the decisions of the Cour de Cassation (Court of Cassation) sometimes makes ‘understanding supports’ necessary so as to make appellate decision understandable. This fact attests to the difficulty of interpreting decisions and the need to adopt a more direct, modern style in their writing. The same tendency can be observed in Portugal.^[51] In other words, everyone must speak the language of Justice, no one must be left behind – it is no coincidence this is the central motto of the 2030 Agenda of the United Nations. In the same vein, in Scandinavia, there is a concern to make the courts as reliable as possible, so that judges strive to make their decisions understandable to the public and, thus, enjoy greater social acceptance.^[52]                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
18. This link between the performance of the Supreme Courts and the understanding of their decisions by the general public is also connected to the theme of judicial precedents. And it is so for a very simple reason: it is precisely on the basis of the reasons given by judges in their reasoned decisions that the precedent is able to come to life and enrich legal systems.^[53] This concern with the communicative aptitude of the decision reveals the need for it not to get lost in the details and to focus on the heart of the foundations that lead to its conclusions.^[54] 

4 Criticism and Trends

19. Of course, the express provision of the duty to provide reasoned decisions and its higher or lower level of detail obey cultural aspects. Countries with a tradition of providing reasoned decisions and providing well-reasoned decisions tend to feel less need to express in the textual form a duty to provide reasoned decisions and to detail them. For this reason, greater legislative detailing of the duty to provide reasoned decisions may, in practice, mean a need for reinforcement – a true reminder – that decisions are properly reasoned.
20. Another interesting aspect regarding this theme lies in its substrate linked to Law Theory. Behind the more or less uniform formulas – providing factual and legal reasons, thorough evidence analysis and so on – used by legislators and courts, what really matters for greater or lesser particularization of the duty to provide reasoned decisions is the existence of a legal culture capable of understanding that there are no raw facts, evidence and norms. In other words: facts, evidence and norms depend on interpretation, which, in turn, refers us to the problem of the logical (deductive, inductive and abductive depending on the case) and argumentative justification of the decision. A sentence for which a reasoned decision was provided must register the reconstruction of every step taken to the solution of the matters attached to the concrete case, taking necessarily into account the activity of the parties, which obviously requires logical and argumentative records.
21. If all of this is true, then it is possible to think of an ideal model of justification based on the following minimal scheme – taken even from the different emerging requirements of comparative law: i) the clear, clean and accessible enunciation of the choices developed by the judicial body for i.i) individualization of the applicable rules, i.ii) evidentiary verification of the factual claims based on the respective correspondence between the statements and reality, i.iii) legal qualification of the factual basis, i.iv) legal consequences arising from the legal qualification of the fact, ii) the definition of the context of the nexus of implication and coherence between the statements, and iii) the justification of the statements based on criteria that evidence the respective rationality.^[55] It is essentially the well-known proposal by Michele Taruffo in his Motivazione, around which several others directly or indirectly revolve. In its structuring, the right to an adversarial proceeding and reasoning, the engines of due process, serve as beacons to a legitimate exercise of power^[56] and to grant accountability and transparency to Civil Justice.^[57]
22. When one looks at the avenues of comparison, this scheme represents an effective common core of the reasoning of judicial decisions – an effective right mixture of different and complementary elements. By means of the dialogue undertaken with Law theory and with factual, evidential and legal elements included therein, it will likely serve as a model to be adopted generally along with the expansion of the right to due process and consequent rationalization of the exercise of power.

5 Final Thoughts

23. There was once a time when it was possible to draw reasonably firm lines between legal experiences and categorize them into distinct traditions, whose own development essentially obeyed a vertical maturation – that is, one that would stem from the historical enrichment of each legal culture individually considered. Such a phenomenon often led to the appearance of remarkable differences between the legal institutions of each of these traditions.
24. The way in which contemporary legal culture ends up evolving little resembles this not-so-remote past. More than a vertical direction, legal traditions nowadays end up developing by means of an ‘interferenze orizzontali’ (horizontal interference)^[58] among the different existing legal systems. The singularity and the specificity of the institutes generally give way to the tendency towards homogenization dictated by the circulation of legal models. Especially with regard to relief, the dissemination of themes of procedural law,^[59] including international norms, such as the one concerning the characterization of the right to due process of law (devido processo, giusto processo, procès équitable, debido proceso, faires Verfahren, fair trial), which obviously includes the right to an effective remedy (diritto alla tutela giurisdizionale effetiva, droit d´accès effectif à la justice, tutela judicial efectiva, Recht auf effektiven Rechtsschutz, direito à tutela jurisdicional adequada, efetiva e tempestiva dos direitos), greatly facilitated the construction of a new jus commune in terms of procedure.^[60] Hence the reciprocal influence among legal traditions and procedural institutes was not a very long step.^[61] It is in this melting pot of culture that one can see the generalization of the duty to provide reasoned decisions: a typical expression of the Rule of Law,^[62] its affirmation comes as a trait of the development of constitutionalism and the affirmation of fundamental rights and duties. It is not by chance that the duty to provide reasoned decisions is - expressly or implicitly – included within the right to due process, striking a blow for civility – and comparison – in Civil Procedure.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACHPR	African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights
ALI	American Law Institute
Art	Article/Articles
BGH	Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice) [Germany]
BCCP	Code of Civil Procedure (Brazil)
CIDH	Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (Interamerican Court of Human Rights)
CJEU	Court of Justice of the European Union
CRFB	Constituicao da Republica Federativa do Brasil (Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil)
coord	coordinator/ coordinators
ECLI	European Case Law Identifier
ECtHR	European Court of Human Rights
ed	editor/editors
edn	edition/editions
eg	exempli gratia (for example)
ELI	European Law Institute
etc	et cetera
EU	European Union
GCCP	Code of Civil Procedure (Germany)
ibid	ibidem (in the same place)
ICCP	Code of Civil Procedure (Italy)
ie	id est (that is)
n	footnote (internal, ie, within the same chapter)
no	number/numbers
para	paragraph/paragraphs
PCCP	Code of Civil Procedure (Portugal)
SCC	Supreme Court Canada
UK	United Kingdom
UNIDROIT	Institut international pour l'unification du droit privé (International Institute for the Unification of Private Law)
UP	University Press
US / USA	United States of America
v	versus
versus	volume/volumes

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Legislation

International/Supranational

Model European Rules of Civil Procedure 2020 (ELI / UNIDROIT)

Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure 2004 (ALI / UNIDROIT)

European Convention on Human Rights 1953

National

Codice di Procedura Civile (Code of Civil Procedure) (Italy)

Código Civil y Comercial Argentino (Civil and Commercial Code) (Argentina)

Código de Processo Civil (Code of Civil Procedure) (Portugal)

Código de Processo Civil 2015 (Code of Civil Procedure) (Brazil)

Código Procesal Civil y Comercial de la Nación (National Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure) (Argentina)

Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil

Human Rights Act 1998 (UK)

Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil (Code of Civil Procedure) (Spain)

Zivilprozessordnung (Code of Civil Procedure) (Germany)

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Cases

International/Supranational

Ruiz Torija v Spain, Case 18390/91 (ECtHR), Judgment 9 December 1994.

Van de Hurk v The Netherlands, Case 16034/90 (ECtHR), Judgment 19 April 1994.

National

English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd (Court of Appeal, UK) [2002] EWCA Civ 605.

Marbury v Madison (Supreme Court, US) [5 US 137 (1803)].

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